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我們很難去理解當前這個複雜的現代世界，而且自從它的機能被資訊科技(IT)大大地擴張之後，我們就更難給這個世界什麼肯定的保證了。IT的內容對於「赤裸」的人眼來說很不明顯，我們僅能透過更多技術來窺視之，而且也僅能透過應用現代科技來瞭解之。這個世界中的變化無法被「自動化」限制住或對應。因此我們要將之減少到可控制的程度。
Our complex modern world is difficult to understand and even more difficult to be assured about since it functions to an increasingly large extent by means of information technology (IT). IT’s contents are not obvious to the “naked” human eye but only made visible with more technology and only understandable by applying modern methodology. The variety of the world cannot be “automatically” limited or matched. It must be reduced to controllable levels.
很明顯地，我們無法監控每個與經濟活動相關的事件、對象、或主題，以及它們個別的內在意圖及狀態；然而，我們可以根據真理設計現代化的資訊系統(MIS)及會計資訊系統(AIS)，如此這些系統在本質上皆為可控制的。否則，內部控制系統(ICS) 僅是一層面紗，在這層面紗之後，許多事件很可能會暗濤洶湧地接踵而至，這些事件可能是有效無效地、明確不明確地、有意無意地、合法非法地、微觀或宏觀地、可理解或無法理解。
Obviously, we cannot monitor every economically relevant event, object or subject and their respective internal dispositions and states; however, we can design modern information systems (MIS) and accounting information systems (AIS) truth-functionally such that they are internally controllable. Otherwise, internal control systems (ICS) are merely screens or veils behind which anything can happen, efficiently or inefficiently, explicitly or implicitly, intentionally or unintentionally, legally or illegally, micro-economically and macro-economically, understandable or not.
舉例來說，梅納德˙凱因斯的知識框架 – 這個世界中十分普遍、無法減化的、且極端的不確定 (而且經理人相對缺乏信心) 導致需求不足時常發生 – 這似乎反應出 (1) 信念與行動之間的因果關係；(2) 能用的資訊並不完備；(3) 對於機率或統計的解釋模稜兩可；以及 (4) 對市場「效率」的強烈質疑。當羅伯特˙斯基德爾斯基在凱因斯：大師歸來[1]中寫道：「當前的危機是系統性忽視 ( 不是資訊不對襯 ) 的危機」，他似乎切中要害，但並沒有根據當責性和可稽核性 ( 請見我先前的文章 ) 的觀點，或使用機率與統計的方法對此做進一步的解釋。
For example, Maynard Keynes’ intellectual framework – a world in which pervasive, irreducible, radical uncertainty (and corresponding lack of confidence by economic agents) leads to persistently inadequate demand - appears to reflect (1) the causal link between beliefs and action; (2) the incompleteness of available information; (3) ambiguous interpretations of probabilities and statistics; and (4) serious doubts about the “efficiency” of markets. - When Robert Skidelsky writes: “The present crisis is a crisis of systemic ignorance not asymmetric information” in Keynes: The Return of the Master[1], he seems to hit the mark, but does not provide an explanation, neither in terms of accountabilities and auditability (see previous blogs) nor by means of probabilities and statistics.
確保 ( 宏觀與微觀上的理解 ) 是要根據足夠的攸關資訊，這些資訊是對於金融和資本市場的行為及組織行為的合理解釋。很明顯地，我們並沒有足夠的證據，但如果透過稽核人員抽樣，我們可以得到足夠的資訊嗎？稽核是種依照案例劃分的問題：在稽核三角中的資金、經理人、與稽核人員，我們要處理三種不同的人與他們個別的利益、關係、責任、與世界觀。他們個別的角色應該夠協調並清楚地定義，而與期望的資訊與確保相關的範圍和限制也要被明確地描述。
Assurance (macro- and micro-economically understood) is based on sufficient relevant evidence for acceptable explanations of money and capital market behavior and organizational behavior, respectively. Evidently, we do not have enough evidence, but can sampling by auditors provide it? - Auditing is a case-by-case problem: In the auditability triangle between principal, agent and auditor we are dealing with three different kinds of persons and their respective interests, relations, responsibilities and world views. Their respective roles ought to be negotiated and clearly defined and the scope and limits of the expected information and assurances specified.
顯然若沒有足夠的相關證據，就不可能在事後解釋已發生的組織或市場行為。因此，根本的做法就是在事件發生時，馬上進行同步的「即時」監控，以便能立刻、即時地將這類行為的變化減低至可允許且可控制的程度。多虧了能夠根據不同品質及相關標準去監控所有交易資訊，現代的稽核技術不只令以上的想法變得可能，也讓它可行且具有經濟效益，當偵測到例外發生時，也能夠知會需要負責修正或進行後續追蹤的人員。所以說，如果有人想透過整合錯誤的會計資訊，達到隨之而來的經濟與統計目的，那他的作法將完全無法提供任何確保。
It is obviously impossible to explain organizational or market behavior that has happened ex post without sufficient relevant evidence and therefore essential to monitor it concur-rently “in real time” in order to reduce the variety of such behavior immediately and instantly to allowable and controllable levels. - Modern audit technology makes this not only possible but feasible and economical by monitoring all transactions according to various quality and relevance criteria and notifying the people responsible for corrections and follow-up of exceptions. To aggregate false accounting information for subsequent econometric and statistical purposes cannot be assuring.
適當的確保能提供可信服於人的 ( 或最好的 ) 解釋，給我們想要知道前因後果與其效果的組織或市場行為。根據可使用的攸關證據，商業交易 ( 狹義稱作「會計紀錄」；廣義稱作「在AIS或MIS介面中出現的所有攸關訊息」) 似乎可以對前因後果作「向前」與「向後」的解釋。我們可以將行動解釋為，是由合理使用可用資源以取得經濟優勢所造成的，也就是盡最大努力 ( 向前 ) ，也可以將行動解釋為，是由使用最少的努力和資源，達成對未來條件的期望所造成的 ( 向後 )。
Since proper assurances are believable (or best) explanations of organizational or market behavior we are dealing with causalities as causes and effects. Economic transactions (defined either narrowly as “accounting records” or broadly as “any kind of relevant messages across interfaces in AIS or MIS”) appear to be causally explainable both “prospectively” and “retrospectively,” depending on the relevant evidence available. We can explain actions as caused either by the rational use of available resources for economic advantage as a deliberate maximizing effort (forward-causation) or by expectations about future conditions to be rationally achieved with deliberate minimal effort and resources (backward causation).
但這樣做還是無法消除不確定性。向前因果是建立在可使用的方法與有價值的資源上，然而向後因果中所需的方法與資源卻在一開始是「空的」。這也許是一種誘因，讓人們透過道德與合法的手段或其他方式，「創造」所需資源。雖然「證券化」像是擔保債務/貸款/房貸憑證目前依然合法，它們可能僅是根據以下這句箴言所創造的「小片或小塊的紙本資源」：為了正當的目的，即使不擇手段地將「賺取」鉅額紅利與獎金建築在他人的風險上也沒關係。
That does not eliminate the uncertainty involved. While forward causation is based on available means and valuable resources, backward causation is initially “empty” with respect to the needed means or resources. It may be a temptation to “create” the required resources by ethical and legal means or otherwise. Although “securitizations” such as collateralized debt/loan/mortgage obligations are currently still legal, they may be mere “sliced and diced paper resources” created retrospectively according to the motto: The ends justify the means needed for trying to “earn” huge bonuses and premiums at someone else’s risk.
這代表什麼？ - 系統化的抽樣，良好地指引，在實際資料中運用稽核模型，當實際資料錯誤地背離適用模型時，應該馬上將非法及不道德的行為暴露出來。既然我們不能確定是不是擁有經過辨識的不可接受條件，那麼就永遠會有無法解釋的殘餘。如果僅是隨機從資料中抽樣，並將這些資料看作只是出於計算上或工具上的方便性，這樣我們既不能解釋它們的前因後果，亦無法藉由統計上的顯著性證實對立假說，而且很可能你的對立假說根本就與手中的確保問題無關。
Where does this leave us? - Systematic sampling, properly conducted, applies audit models to actual data and should expose illegal and unethical behavior when the actual data diverges improperly from the applicable models. Since we cannot be certain about having all unacceptable conditions identified, there will always be an unexplainable residue. To sample data randomly and to treat them as if they were representative simply out of computational or instrumental convenience can be counted upon neither to explain them causally nor to corroborate alternative hypothesis other than by statistical significance and may be irrelevant to the assurance problem at hand.
所以說，那些需要執行稽核的人的認知負擔是相當沉重的。
The cognitive burdens of those who undertake audits are considerable.
[1]請見經濟學人，2009.10.03，第103-104頁。
[1] Reviewed in The Economist, Oct.3, 2009, pp.103-104.
© Copyright 2009 by Hart J. Will
翻譯：中正會資所 汪修平
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