信念會影響我們行為,因為它使我們在不同的環境背景下,採取不同的行動。這些環境背景的特點是由我們的能力、其它信念、潛力、道德規範、動機以及機會之間的複雜相互作用而成(James H. Fetzer)-但信念並非能直接觀察得到。理想的情況下,我們的信念會始終如一的支撐我們到成功。但即便如此,信念還是得在我們的控制之下符合各式各樣現存的社會體制,至少要能跟得上世界變化的腳步。【記得Ashby的必要多樣性法則中曾述:「只有多樣性能摧毀多樣性」-這是一個基本的管理控制原則】 Specific beliefs have consequences for our behavior since they determine our actions in various contexts. These contexts are characterized by the complex interaction of our abilities, other beliefs, capabilities, ethics, motivations, and opportunities (James H. Fetzer) – not all directly observable. - Ideally, our beliefs will support consistent successes, but to do so, they must match the variety of the systems under our control and change with at least the same speed with which the world changes. [Remember Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety: “Only variety can destroy variety” - a basic control principle].
無論是在規劃預算時,或是事件發生後,財務會計資訊都能偽造一段期間(損益表或現金流量表)或特定時點(資產負債表)下,單一經濟行為與整體經濟相關行為的成敗。無論是賒銷或現銷,我們均打算「買低賣高」,並且在「成本低於預期市價」的情況下提供勞務或商品。由於我們不能保證估計值的區間與精準度,所以經濟活動不但具有風險,且無法確定一定會成功。經濟行為在某種程度上永遠是個未知數,以至於我們不能預知它所有可能的結果。即使我們相信手上的資訊能協助我們,將成功的機率提升至可接受的程度(假如真值P<1),但無論你如何定義「成功」,別忘了仍存在1-P的失敗機率。 Financial accounting information pretends to signal success or failure of single economic actions and of aggregate economically relevant behavior over time periods (income and cash flow statements) or at different points in time (balance sheets) - either ex post (after the fact) or ex ante (as budgets). We “buy low to sell high” and produce goods and services at “lower cost than the expected market price” for cash or for credit. Since we have neither a guarantee of such spreads nor reliable probabilities for estimating them correctly, economic actions are not only risky, but their success is largely uncertain. Economic behavior is always uncertain to the extent that we do not know all of its consequences with “plausible” probabilities. Even if we believe information about success to an acceptable degree (with a probable truth value p < 1), there is the risk of 1-p that we fail or failed, regardless of how “success” is defined.
因此我們嘗試規避風險,像是規避以賒帳方式取得約當現金的壞帳風險,或是規避外幣交易取得約當現金的外匯風險,我們也可能想規避利息波動所帶來的利率風險。整個「衍生性商品產業」已經發展到不只能規避任何權利金的特定風險,還提供我們從簡單的利率選擇權到任何錯綜複雜的信用違約交割、擔保債務憑證,以及任何的「證券化」(塔式)契約-因此這個號稱「有效率的」市場,能提供廉價、高流動性、且不具任何適切法律規範的短期融資,然而我們能盲目地相信這些可利用的資訊嗎? Therefore we try to hedge against such risks as not receiving the cash equivalent of sales on credit or at equivalent foreign exchange rates. We may also want to insure ourselves against specific changes of interest rates in the future. The whole “derivatives-industry” has evolved not only to reduce any specific risks for a premium. It has also offered us anything from simple interest rate options to ever more intricate credit-default swaps, collateralized debt obligations, and other “securitized” (pyramids of) paper - financed by short-term debt due to cheap liquidity and without proper legal regulation of the markets that were declared to be “efficient.” Can we blindly believe the available information?
這個議題不單單只是如代理理論所假設的:委託人提供資金,而專業經理人提供「財務專業」而已。事實上,這更像是「用借來的錢大賭特賭,反正一切風險都由委託人來承擔」-所以委託人應注意任何直接和自己個別或整體利益產生衝突的財務資訊、通知和徵兆。因為運用委託人資金的專業經理人,很可能受到誘惑,進而偽造獲利或成功的資訊:這是法律所無法避免的,所以稱為「道德危機」! The issues are not merely monetary as assumed by agency theory where principals provide the capital and agents apply their “financial expertise.” The reality is more like “gambling with borrowed capital at the principals’ risk!” - We should therefore never forget that financial information, messages and signs are prepared by agents of all kinds whose individual and combined interests may be diametrically opposed to the recipient’s. Agents dependent on a principal’s capital may be tempted to “massage” their profitability and success: Legal accountability does not preclude so-called “moral hazard!”
「信仰」也許是盲目且不需要任何保證,但它也可能是一種經過歷史環境洗鍊出的成果,因此值得我們從確信或審計的觀點去注意它。「信任」則有一個認知構面,因為它很少是「盲目的」,而是奠基於資訊提供者能對信任他的人,付出良好的態度、忠誠的行為與基本的尊重:輕蔑的態度是很容易被察覺的!我們藉由自我認知的努力、信仰或信任形成信念,但是當連掌握許多內控資訊的央行都不能保護我們免於金融風暴,同時法律所規範的社會契約已被「專家」濫用時,我們還能「不加思索地」相信那些合法取得的資訊嗎? Can legally required information be “automatically” believed when not even the central banks with lots of internal control data could protect us from the collapse of the financial system and when the social contract implied by laws has been abused by “experts”? - We form beliefs by means of cognitive effort, faith or trust. Faith may be blind and require no assurances, but it may also be the result of conditioning processes that deserve our attention from an assurance and audit point of view. Even trust has a cognitive dimension, because it is seldom “blind” but is based on the information provider’s observable attention to, loyalty towards, and fundamental respect for the trusting persons: Disrespect is noticeable!
我們知道若專業經理人代理委託人完成具有稅務影響之經濟活動或經濟行為,那麼專業經理人就應當真實地記錄這些交易資訊。這些數據就是估計資產、負債與淨資產的實際值與終值之基礎。要瞭解及評估使用數據所提供的資訊,可將它們分成下列三類: (1)可直接觀察的活動/對象/狀態/科目之可直接觀察屬性(實證數據); (2)可直接觀察的活動/對象/狀態/科目之不可直接觀察屬性(處分); (3)不可直接觀察的事件/對象/狀態/科目之不可直接觀察屬性(理論資訊)。(James H. Fetzer)。 We know that if economic actions and behavior are done on behalf of someone else (principals) and if they have taxable consequences, then they must be recorded as actual transactions between economic agents. These data are the foundation for hypothetical assessments of actual or future values of assets, liabilities and net capital. To understand the data used for providing such information and to assess them means to distinguish between (1) directly observable attributes of directly observable event/objects/states/-subjects (empirical data); (2) unobservable attributes of directly observable event/-objects/states/subjects (dispositions); and unobservable attributes of unobservable event/objects/states/subjects (theoretical information). (James H. Fetzer).
除非專業經理人故意且成功地欺騙委託人,否則委託人可以憑藉經驗來「驗證」專業經理人提供勞務或商品等會計交易(經濟活動)是否屬實。當能驗證這類會計交易是否屬實的執行人不再收集攸關資訊,而改由機器設備取代時,則可能面臨機器故障或程式異常的問題,此時這些攸關資訊就不再是「實證數據」,因為它們已經成為資訊系統的產物,可能正確,亦可能錯誤,所以需要藉由其他的證據來評估,如審計軌跡或其他攸關的內控資料。在諸多的情況下,個體經濟與總體經濟所提供的數據會是錯誤的,所以一位明智的委託人,應瞭解會計人員或統計人員(數據管理人)「背後」所採用任何獨特的時間序列,而非盲目的將公開的報告或統計資料當作實證數據般的信任。 Observable accounting transactions (economic events) of observable exchanges of goods and services (objects) produced by agents (subjects) with any kind of relevant observable attribute can be empirically “verified” - unless the agents involved are deliberately and successfully deceiving their counterparts about any of these attributes. When relevant data are not collected by critical observers who may measure and experiment to identify observable reality, but instead by machine-based systems that may malfunction or be programmed for deception or obfuscation, then they are no longer “empirical data.” - They have become dispositions of information systems (and the organizations they depict) that may or may not be true. Their truth may need to be inferred from other relevant evidence such as audit trails and other internal control data. It is advisable to know the human accountant or statistician (data administrator) “behind” any particular time series rather than to blindly believe a published report or statistic as “empirically true.” Too many micro- and macro-economic data are faulty in various ways!
虛擬的資訊是最難相信的,除非它是基於永恆且可用經驗去試驗的自然法則。例如:公司依主觀或客觀的市場狀況與風險,所評估出來的預計短期利潤(每季、每半年或每年),即使能反映社會的人文法則,但仍會令人無法相信。而支付雇員與管理人員龐大的的紅利與津貼這類資訊,因為是建立於擁有適當功能且穩定運作的銀行或財政系統,所以儘管資料可能不夠真實,但反而是能以批判精神加以試驗的資訊。 Theoretical information is hardest to believe unless it is based on natural laws that are by definition immutable and empirically testable. For example, the short-term profits calculated by companies (quarterly, semiannually or annually) represent theoretical information that may be based on subjective and unspecified assessments of market conditions and risks, even if they reflect cultural laws. - To pay employees and managers enormous bonuses and premiums on the basis of such information is based on numerous assumptions such as the proper functioning and stability of the banking and financial system. These may not be true in the short, medium or longer-term, but they are testable with a critical mind.
若行為是基於「一次就幸運猜對」的原則,而非「試誤法」,則所有的資訊,包含合法取得的資訊,都可能是非攸關的。相反地,考量能產生不同結果的資訊才是有效益的,即使這些資訊不是合法取得的。我們不應該相信任何沒有充分證據的事情,尤其當可能產生的後果愈嚴重時,我們應該取得確信程度愈高的資訊。 If behavior is based on the principle of “lucky trial without error” instead of that of “risky trial and possible error” then all information may be irrelevant, including that legally required. Otherwise, only the information that may make a difference to the outcome under consideration is of interest, even if it is not legally provided or required. - We should not believe anything unless we had sufficient evidence with degrees of certainty commensurate with our assessment of the dangers of failure. The more serious the consequences are for taking actions based on false beliefs the more assurances we need.
© Copyright 2009 by Hart J. Will
翻譯:中正會資所 陳譽民 |